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NOTES
Constitutional Law: Activating the Middle Tier After
Plyler v. Doe: Cleburne Living Center v. City of
Cleburne
In the period following Justice Stone's famous footnote four in the
Carolene Products case,' the Supreme Court has been engaged in a continual
and difficult process of defining the situations that should trigger a higher
level of judicial suspicion when the Court reviews legislative enactments.e
When the Court uses a higher level of scrutiny, it more closely examines the
relationship between the purpose for which the legislation is drafted and the
means the legislature has used to meet that purpose. The use of heightened
scrutiny places the Court in a closer and more exacting oversight relationship
with the legislature.
Some commentators have advocated the Court's use of a higher level of
scrutiny in examining legislative action as a means of furthering social goals.3
This expansion of the categories and situations triggering heightened judicial
scrutiny under the equal protection clause" has also consistently provoked
criticism from academic commentators and members of the Court who feel
that it is an improper exercise of judicial activism. 5
There has also been some support for a complete abandonment of the
traditional criteria necessary for the Court to invoke heightened scrutiny in
1. Justice Stone stated in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), that
the Court had not inquired into "whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry." Id. at 152 n.4.
2. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949):
"[S]elf restraint is no virtue if the court has a unique function to perform. If, on the other hand,
the self restraint is justified, the belief in a unique judicial function is untenable. These dif-
ficulties plague the court at every stage in the process of applying the Equal Protection clause."
Id. at 366.
3. See, e.g., Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 2; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUMONAL LAW
(1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE]; Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972); Blattner,
The Supreme Court's "Intermediate" Equal Protection Decisions: Five Imperfect Models of
Constitutional Equality, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 777 (1981); Note, Equal Protection: A Closer
Look at Closer Scrutiny, 76 MICH. L. REV. 771 (1978).
4. The fourteenth amendment in pertinent part states that "no state shall.., deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONT. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). "I think that this
branch of the compelling interest doctrine is sound when applied to racial classifications, for
historically the equal protection clause was largely a product of the desire to eradicate legal
distinctions founded upon race. However, I believe that the more recent extensions have been
unwise." Id. at 659.
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the examination of legislative actions. For example, Justice Marshall has
argued for a "spectrum of standards" in reviewing discrimination allegedly
violating the equal protection clause. 6 The Court, in each instance, would
make an ad hoc determination of the proper level of judicial suspicion to use
in reviewing the legislative enactment. Marshall's argument is that it would
be more candid and realistic to examine each case under a "sliding scale" of
judicial suspicion, depending on the interests affected and the need for the
legislation. The adoption of this viewpoint would greatly enlarge the
parameters of the Court's review of legislative action.
This note will examine the method the Court used in deciding the proper
level of scrutiny in Plyler v. Doe." The note will then examine how this ap-
parently new method of triggering heightened scrutiny used in Plyler was ap-
plied by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cleburne Living Center v. City
of Cleburne.8 The Cleburne decision raises strong questions as to whether the
Plyler approach to equal protection questions should be applied outside of
the unusual facts and circumstances of the Plyler case.
The Traditional Methods of Triggering Heightened Scrutiny
Under the Equal Protection Clause
The underlying principle of the equal protection clause is that statutes can-
not create classifications affording different treatment to persons who are
similarly situated.9 Under traditional equal protection analysis, courts ex-
amine legislation under a rational basis standard. A statute is presumed valid
and is upheld if the statutory classification rationally relates to any legitimate
state goal." The rational basis standard is highly deferential to the legislative
process.1
6. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing):
The Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal protection cases fall into
one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review-strict
scrutiny or mere rationality. But this court's decisions in the field of equal protec-
tion defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what this court has
done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimina-
tion allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This spectrum clearly com-
prehends variations in the degree of care with which the court will scrutinize par-
ticular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal im-
portance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the
basis on which the particular classification is drawn.
Id. at 98-99. Rodriguez was an unsuccessful equal protection challenge to the Texas method of
public school funding which results in differences in per pupil allotments in different school
districts.
7. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
8. 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 735 F.2d 832 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct.
427 (1984).
9. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216. See also F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,
415 (1920); Note, Undocumented Aliens' Rights to Medicaid after Plyler v. Doe, 7 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 83 (1983).
10. City of New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
11. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216.
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An example of how the rational basis test operates was the Court's deci-
sion in Williamson v. Lee Optical.2 An Oklahoma law required an op-
tometrist's prescription each time a person had eyeglasses fitted or
duplicated. There was no legislative history accompanying the Oklahoma
statute to explain the rationale behind the legislature's actions. Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court postulated possible reasons that could have compelled the
passage of the bill and this was sufficient to pass the scrutiny of the rational
basis test. This deference to the possible intent of the legislature demonstrates
how slight the judicial scrutiny of legislative action is under the rational basis
test. The underlying concept is that if there is nothing within the legislation
to trigger the Court's suspicion, the Court should defer to the legislative pro-
cess and separation of powers.
If the Court in Plyler had examined the Texas statute 3 under the tradi-
tional rational basis test, the statute would likely have been upheld as con-
stitutional. The Texas legislature's desire to conserve educational resources
could have been a rational basis for barring illegal alien children from the
state's public schools. However, the Court in Plyler rejected the rational
basis test as an inappropriate standard of review.
The Supreme Court has opted for a more stringent level of scrutiny when
legislation infringes on fundamental rights or burdens a suspect class."
Under this strict scrutiny standard the legislation must substantially further a
compelling state interest." The Supreme Court has to date recognized three
suspect" classes that trigger strict scrutiny: race, 7 national origin, 8 and
alienage."I In Plyler the Court held that illegal alienage was not to be accorded
12. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
13. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1982). Section 21.031 provides
in pertinent part that "(a) All children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted
aliens and who are over the age of five years and under the age of twenty-one years on the first
day of September of any scholastic year shall be entitled to the benefits of the Available School
Fund for that year."
14. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969).
15. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217: "With respect to such classifications, it is appropriate to enforce
the mandate of equal protection by requiring the State to demonstrate that its classification has
been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."
16. Id. at 216 n.14:
Several formulations might explain our treatment of certain classifications as
"suspect." Some classifications are more likely than others to reflect deep-seated
prejudice rather than legislative rationality in the pursuit of some legitimate objec-
tive. Legislation predicated on such prejudice is easily recognized as incompatible
with the constitutional understanding that each person is to be judged individually
and is entitled to equal justice under the law.
See Note, Constitutional Law: Equal Protection Rights of Illegal Alien School Children, 23
HARV. INT'L L.J. 389 (1983).
17. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964);
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
19. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
1985]
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the same status as alienage and rejected the claim that illegal aliens are a
suspect class. "Unlike most of the classifications that we have recognized as
suspect, entry into this class, by virtue of entry into this country, is the prod-
uct of voluntary action. Indeed, entry into the class is itself a crime." 20
Therefore, in Plyler the Court rejected the strict scrutiny standard of review.
The second area in which the Court applies strict scrutiny is when a right
infringed by a statutory classification is considered by the Court to be fun-
damental.2 1 The Plyler Court did not find that a fundamental right had been
infringed upon. Therefore, this was not the trigger for the Plyler Court's use
of heightened scrutiny. In Plyler the Court declined to hold that public
education is a fundamental right. 22 In a later opinion, Martinez v. Bynum, 23
the Court explicitly stated that public education is not a fundamental right
invoking strict scrutiny.
Before Plyler, dissatisfaction with the two-tiered equal protection system,
under which either strict scrutiny or the rational basis test were the exclusive
standards of review, had emerged in both the academic community and on
the Court.24 The basic problem was that the net effect of strict scrutiny
analysis was to strike down legislation because the legislature had to meet the
very difficult standard of demonstrating a compelling state interest. More-
over, the use of the rational basis test on legislative enactments amounted to
almost no review at all. The two tests were applied almost mechanically,
pigeonholing cases into either strict or rational categories with little room for
judicial flexibility.
The Emergence of "Middle Level" Scrutiny
The next major step in the development of the scrutiny doctrine was the
Court's recognition of a middle or intermediate level of scrutiny. The first
application of a middle-level test was in cases involving gender and il-
20. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19.
21. In Plyler the Court gave a nonexclusive list of fundamental rights to be used in determin-
ing whether a class-based denial of a particular right is deserving of strict scrutiny under the
equal protection clause.
[W]e look to the Constitution to see if the right infringed has its source, explicitly
or implicitly therein. But we have also recognized the fundamentality of participa-
tion in state elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction. Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) . . .; San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 .... ; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections 383
U.S. 663, 667 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. at 356, 370 (1886).
457 U.S. at 217 n.15.
22. Id. at 221.
23. 461 U.S. 321, 328 n.7 (1983).
24. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). Powell stated that: "There
are valid reasons for dissatisfaction with the 'two-tier' approach that has been prominent in the
courts' decisions in the past decade." Id. at 210. He added that, "[C]andor compels the recogni-
tion that the relatively deferential 'rational basis' standard of review normally applied takes on a
sharper focus when we address a gender based classification." Id. at 211. See also TRE, supra
note 3, at 1082.
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legitimacy. Commentators have said that the basis for the Court's use of
heightened scrutiny in these situations was that "sensitive although not
necessarily suspect criteria of classification are employed." 25
Until recently, the Supreme Court applied the deferential rational basis
standard of review to gender classifications.25 Legislation was upheld if the
Court could find it to be rationally related to some legitimate state objective.
This state objective was often the preservation of women's "proper role" in
society. 27 In the early 1970s, however, the Court began to use a form of
heightened review on gender-based classifications.
28
The Court now uses an intermediate or middle level of review for gender
classifications. This standard was articulated in Craig v. Boren.29 Craig v.
Boren involved a successful challenge to an Oklahoma statute that allowed
the sale of 3.2 beer to males over the age of twenty-one and to females over
the age of eighteen. The constitutional claim was that the statute denied
equal protection to males aged eighteen to twenty. The Court held that the
appropriate standard of review of gender-based classifications was that
"classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. ' ' °
Another area in which the Court has used middle-level scrutiny is in cases
involving illegitimacy." In Trimble v. Gordon32 the Court invalidated a por-
tion of an Illinois intestate succession plan that prevented illegitimate
children from inheriting from their fathers. The Court used a heightened
standard of review. Justice Rehnquist, however, in his dissenting opinion,
contended that anything more than the most deferential equal protection
review should be used only "in the area of the law in which the framers
honestly meant the clause to apply, classifications based on race or national
origin, the first cousin of race."33
It has also been suggested that the Supreme Court applies an intermediate
standard of review to classifications that involve rights that, although not
fundamental, are considered by the Court to be of special importance." ' The
25. See TRIBE, supra note 3, at 1090; Note, Undocumented Children: A Sensitive Class, 8 J.
Juv. L. 87, 89 (1984).
26. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
27. Id. at 466.
28. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
29. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
30. Id. at 197.
31. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). See also Note, Un-
documented Children, supra note 25.
32. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). See also Mills v. Habluetzal, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982): "Such restric-
tions will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent that they are substantially related to a
legitimate state interest."
33. Trimble, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
34. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 1090.
The court has employed intermediate forms of review where governmental depriva-
tions affected such important interests of the individual as the interest in retaining
driver's licenses [Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971)], in obtaining a higher
education at an affordable tuition [Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 459 (1973)
1985]
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argument is that the Court uses a higher standard of review even though it
purports to use the rational basis test. This is a questionable thesis in light of
the Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez." In Rodriguez, the limitation of a right (education) recognized by
the Court as important, but not fundamental, apparently did not cause the
Court to raise the standard of review from the traditional rational basis test.
The Method of Triggering Heightened Scrutiny in Plyler v. Doe
Rather than applying traditional equal protection analysis, the Plyler
Court stepped outside of the methods that had previously been used to deter-
mine the applicable level of scrutiny. The Court in Plyler stated that:
[W]e have recognized that certain forms of legislative classifica-
tion, while not facially invidious, nonetheless give rise to recurring
constitutional difficulties; in those limited circumstances we have
sought the assurance that the classification reflects a reasonable
judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protection by inquir-
ing whether it may fairly be viewed as furthering a substantial in-
terest of the state.
6
Thus, instead of separately examining the classification and the benefit
denied, which under traditional analysis would have resulted in the applica-
tion of the rational basis test, the Plyler Court based its use of a heightened
standard of review on the interaction between the class (illegal alien children)
and the importance of the benefit (education)."
This expanded method of triggering heightened scrutiny received stiff
criticism from Chief Justice Burger in his dissent: "by patching together bits
and pieces of what might be termed quasi-suspect class and quasi-
fundamental-rights analysis, the court spins out a theory custom-tailored to
the facts of these cases.'"
(White, J., concurring)], in receiving subsistence benefits such as food stamps
[United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 519 (1973) Mar-
shall, J., concurring].
Tribe concludes that "either a significant interference with liberty or a denial of a benefit vital to
the individual triggers intermediate review." Id.
35. 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
36. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217-18.
37. Id. at 223-24:
In determining the rationality of § 21.031, we may appropriately take into account
its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children who are its victims, In light of
these countervailing costs, the discrimination in § 21.031 can hardly be considered
rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the state.
See Note, Equal Protection, Education, and the Undocumented Alien Child: Plyler v. Doe, 7
Hous. L. Rv, 899 (1984),
38. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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The Test for Heightened Scrutiny in Plyler v. Doe
A second difference from the previous cases that used an intermediate
form of review is that Plyler used a different standard for intermediate
scrutiny. The Court mentioned but did not use the Craig v. Boren test.
39
Rather than using the traditional middle-level test that classifications must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
the achievement of those governmental objectives, the Plyler Court used the
formulation that the statute "can hardly be considered rational unless it fur-
thers some substantial goal of the state.""' The opinion concludes that "[i]f
the state is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public
education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that
denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state
interest.""
It is unclear whether the majority in Plyler was attempting to restate the in-
termediate test in a different form or if this is a different test, perhaps due to
the unique circumstances of the case. 42 Chief Justice Burger criticized this
method, stating in his dissent that:
In the end, we are told little more than that the level of scrutiny
employed to strike down the Texas law applies only when illegal
alien children are deprived of public education.... If ever a court
was guilty of an unabashedly result-oriented approach, this case is
a prime example. 43
Application of Heightened Scrutiny in Plyler v. Doe
In applying the test, the Court rejected Texas' principal argument that the
statute was valid because it was consistent with federal policies embodied in
the immigration laws regarding undocumented aliens." The Court also re-
jected the second argument offered by the appellants that the state's desire to
conserve educational resources provided constitutionally sufficient grounds
for denying free public education to illegal alien children.'5
The majority noted that the state might in some circumstances have an in-
terest in employing a classification that disfavored illegal aliens when that
classification would limit serious economic effects of sudden shifts in popula-
39. Id. at 218 n.16.
40. Id. at 224.
41. Id. at 230.
42. See Note, Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection Clause: The Effect of Plyler v. Doe
on Intermediate Scrutiny, 36 OKLA. L. REv. 321 (1983); Note, Undocumented Childen, supra
note 25, at 93.
43. 457 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 215.
45. Id. at 227. The Court stated that a state's desire to conserve resources could not justify
the denial of public education.
1985]
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tion." The Court held, however, that Texas had not demonstrated that the
educational services were the cause of the illegal migration. The Court also
rejected the state's argument that the exclusion would benefit public educa-
tion. The Court noted that the exclusion of this group of illegal alien children
would not necessarily improve the education for other children in the school
district.47 Finally, the state could not demonstrate that undocumented
children were less likely than other children to remain within the borders of
the state because the state has no assurance that any child receiving a public
education will remain within its borders.
4 8
The denial of the state's arguments demonstrate that the burden of
meeting the test of "furthering a substantial governmental interest" is a dif-
ficult one. 9 It is unclear whether the test formulated is a stricter standard
than the Craig v. Boren test due to the special needs of the illegal alien
children. If the Plyler standard proves to be stricter, the Court is seemingly
free to formulate different standards of review in each particular situation.
This result would be similar to the "spectrum" of standards suggested by
Justice Marshall in his dissent in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez."
Cleburne's Interpretation of Plyler
The methodology espoused in Plyler is now being interpreted by the lower
courts. Thus, to understand the impact that Plyler may have on judicial
review, it is instructive to examine how one court interpreted and applied that
methodology.
In Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne," the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals examined a Cleburne, Texas zoning ordinance that excluded a group
home " for mentally retarded persons from the permitted uses in an apart-
ment house district.5 3 The owners of the proposed group home challenged the
ordinance under the Federal Revenue Sharing Act and the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment."' Because the zoning ordinance
regulated mentally retarded persons, the Cleburne court held that the or-
dinance must be examined under the, " 'intermediate' level of scrutiny
established by the Supreme Court."" Subjected to this level of scrutiny, the
46. Id. at 224.
47. Id. at 229.
48. Id. at 230.
49. See Note, Constitutional Law: Equal Protection Rights of Illegal Alien School Children,
supra note 16, at 392.
50. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 70.
51. 726 F,2d 191 (1984).
52. The court noted that: "The ... home would be subject to extensive regulations and
guidelines established and administered by the United States Department of Health and Human
Resources, the Texas Department of Human Resources, the Texas Department of Mental Health
and Mental Retardation and the Texas Department of Health." Id. at 193.
53. Id. at 192.
54. Id. The Cleburne court found the Revenue Sharing Act argument inapplicable.
55. Id. at 193.
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city of Cleburne failed to demonstrate that the ordinance substantially fur-
thered a significant governmental interest; the court therefore held that the
ordinance violated the equal protection clause.56
In examining the zoning ordinance," the court relied on the statement in
Plyler that if the classification, while not facially invidious, gives rise to
recurring constitutional difficulties, some form of heightened scrutiny is ap-
propriate. 8 The court acted on Plyler's enunciation of an alternative method
of triggering heightened equal protection analysis.59
The Cleburne court adopted the Plyler reasoning that the interaction be-
tween the classification and the object of the classification combined to trig-
ger heightened scrutiny. However, the court did not use the constitutional
test in Plyler that the denial of the benefit must further a substantial state in-
terest.60 Instead, it used the middle-level Craig v. Boren test previously ap-
plied to cases involving gender and illegitimacy. 6'
The Cleburne court centered its analysis in deciding the appropriate level
of scrutiny on the question of whether the class of mentally retarded persons
is "suspect" or at least possesses sufficient characteristics of a "suspect"
class to warrant intermediate review. The court interpreted the Plyler deci-
sion to hold implicitly that if a class of persons possess sufficient
characteristics of a "suspect" class, the statutory classification should
undergo heightened scrutiny. Similar to the analysis in Plyler, the court noted
that if membership in the minority class is immutable, the Supreme Court is
more likely to give the class special protection by the use of heightened
scrutiny.62 The court noted that some federal district courts had discussed
this issue, 63 but it found no appellate opinions that used a heightened review
for legislation that classified on the basis of mental retardation.
56. Id.
57. The permitted uses under the ordinance were:
1. Any use permitted in District R-2.
2. Apartment houses, or multiple dwellings.
3. Boarding and lodging houses.
4. Fraternity or sorority houses and dormitories.
5. Apartment hotels.
6. Hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes, or houses for convalescents or aged,
other than for the insane or feebleminded or alcoholics or drug addicts
7. Private clubs or fraternal orders, except those whose chief activity is carried
on as a business.
8. Philanthropic or eleemosynary institutions other than penal institutions.
9. Accessory uses customarily incident to any of the above uses.
Id. at 193 (emphasis added).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 191, citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 216.
60. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
61. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
62. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (illegitimate children have no control
over their situation). Cf. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (minor children of illegal aliens are not in this
country voluntarily and, therefore, are not comparably situated with their parents).
63. Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 196 n.7:
See Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Olson, 561 F. Supp.
1985]
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The Cleburne court stated that discrimination against the mentally retard-
ed is likely to reflect deep-seated prejudice. The court noted the presence un-
til comparatively recently of mandatory sterilization laws 4 and mentioned
the trial court's finding of the impact on the mentally retarded of remote,
stigmatizing living centers." The court also stated that "once technical terms
for mental retardation (e.g., idiots, imbeciles, and morons) have become
popular terms of derision. ' "6 In addition, the court recognized that mentally
retarded persons have historically lacked political power. 67 The court believed
that the motivation behind the Cleburne zoning ordinance was a deep-seated
prejudice against the mentally retarded. 6
The Cleburne court concluded that they were not prepared to hold that the
mentally retarded persons were a full-fledged suspect class" because mental
retardation is a relevant distinction in some cases. Instead, the court held that
mentally retarded persons are only a "quasi-suspect class"' 0 and that laws
discriminating against the mentally retarded should be examined under in-
termediate scrutiny. However, the court did not decide the question of
whether heightened scrutiny is appropriate for classifications concerning the
mentally ill.7'
473, 490 (D.N.D. 1982) (intermediate scrutiny appropriate for classifications
discriminating against mentally retarded persons); Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F.
Supp. 946, 957-59 (Ed. Pa. 1975) (dictum); Cf. Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F.
Supp. 832, 836 (Ed. Pa. 1976) (classification discriminating against learning disabl-
ed should be tested under intermediate scrutiny) (dictum). But see, New York State
Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F.Supp. 752, 762 (Ed. N.Y.
1973) (inmates of a state institution for mentally retarded not a suspect class);
Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Center v. Melton, 521 F.Supp. 365, 371
(D.N.H. 1981) (same); Anderson v. Banks, 520 F.Supp. 472, 512 (S.D. Ga. 1981)
(mentally retarded persons not a "quasi-suspect class").
64. Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 197. See also Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding
Virginia compulsory sterilization law); O'Hara & Sanks, Eugenic Sterilization, 45 GEO. L.J. 30
(1956).
65. Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 193:
Group homes currently are the principal community living alternatives for persons
who are mentally retarded. The availability of such a home in communities is an
essential ingredient of normal living patterns for persons who are mentally retard-
ed, and each factor that makes such group homes harder to establish operates to
exclude persons who are mentally retarded from the community.
Id. The court relied on the district court finding in Cleburne Living Ctr. v. City of Cleburne,
No. CA 3-80-1576F, slip op. at 7 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
66. Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 197.
67. Id. "The Cleburne ordinance discriminates between the mentally retarded and other
groups-e.g. the elderly that also require supervision but may establish group homes in the R-3
district without a special use permit. This distinction is likely to reflect the deep-seated historical
prejudice against the mentally retarded."
68. Id. See also Note, Mentai Disability and the Right to Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979).
69. Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 198.
70. Id. "The combination of these factors-historical prejudice, political powerlessness, and
immutability call for heightened scrutiny of classifications discriminating against the mentally
retarded."
71. Id.
Some courts and commentators have suggested that mentally ill persons are a
suspect or a quasi-suspect class. See e.g. Sterling v. Harris, 478 F. Supp. 1046
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol38/iss1/11
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Central to the court's decision in Cleburne was the interaction of the
classification and the benefit used to invoke heightened scrutiny in Plyler."
The court noted that heightened scrutiny was "particularly appropriate to the
case at bar, because the Cleburne ordinance as applied withholds a benefit
which, though not fundamental, is very important to the mentally
retarded.""
The Cleburne court also relied upon a recent Ninth Circuit decision that used
the same triggering approach found in Plyler.14 In J. W. v. City of Tacoma,"
the court reviewed a local zoning ordinance that required a special use permit
before the establishment of a home for former mental patients. Intermediate
scrutiny was held to be applicable because the class shared some of the
characteristics of "suspect" classes and because the ordinance denied important
benefits. 76 For the same reasons, the Cleburne court concluded that "intermedi-
ate scrutiny is particularly appropriate in reviewing an ordinance that restricts
the availability of group homes for the mentally retarded."77
Cleburne's Application of the Middle-Level Test
As noted previously, the Cleburne court applied the test formulated in Craig
v. Boren.78 As in Plyler, there was not a sufficiently close relationship between
(N.D. Ill. 1979); Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704, 710 (3rd Cir. 1979); Schweiker v.
Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981) (mentally ill a "quasi-suspect" class). But see Benham
v. Edwards, 678 F.2d 511, 515 n.9 (5th Cir. 1982). In any event, mental retarda-
tion is functionally different from mental illness and the differences cut in favor of
heightened scrutiny for the retarded. Mental retardation is not an emotional
disorder but a learning problem; it arguably invokes fewer safety concerns than
does mental illness. More important, mental retardation, unlike many mental ill-
nesses is an immutable disorder. The mentally retarded cannot be cured. Finally,
mental illness covers a broader spectrum of disorders and is more difficult to
define than mental retardation.
Id. at 198 n.ll.
72. Id. at 199: "See Plyler v. Doe, supra, 102 S. Ct. at 2398; Tribe, supra at 1089-90....
The Court held that heightened scrutiny was appropriate not only because the children shared
some of the characteristics of a suspect class, but also because they were denied an important
benefit."
73. 726 F.2d at 199:
In the same way, the exclusion of group homes from Cleburne operates to prevent
mentally retarded persons from assimilating into and contributing to their society.
Isolated from normal community patterns, they can never hope to adapt. The
resulting awkwardness of retarded persons as well as the fact of state sanctioned
isolation further stigmatizes the group and provides additional barriers to their
hope for self improvement.
74. Id. at 199.
75. 720 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1983).
76. Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 199 citing J.W. v. City of Tacoma, 720 F.2d at 1129:
We note . . . that the benefits the ordinance restricts are the former mental pa-
tients' access to housing and rehabilitative purposes. While they are not funda-
mental rights, they like education at issue in Plyler, are essential to individuals full
participation in society. Indeed, for former mental patients, a reintegration into
society accomplished through living in a moderately structured setting in a residen-
tial neighborhood is an essential part of therapy.
77. 726 F.2d at 200.
78. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (requiring a closer fit between the legislative objective and
1985]
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the ordinance's goal and the ordinance's means of achieving that goal. The
Cleburne court held that the requirement of a special use permit for all group
homes for the mentally retarded was both vastly overbroad and vastly
underinclusive. 79 The court then examined the factors that went into the city
council's decision to deny the special use permit. 80 The court concluded that
none of the proffered reasons for denying the permit substantially served an
important governmental interest. As a result of the analysis, the court con-
cluded that the application of the ordinance denied equal protection."
As in Plyler, the legislative rationales did not survive heightened scrutiny.
As evidenced by the state's arguments in Plyler and the Cleburne City
Council's arguments in Cleburne, this heightened scrutiny is a comparatively
stringent test. Apart from the semantical differences between the test used in
Plyler and the test used in Cleburne, it is apparent that it is difficult to meet the
burden of this intermediate level of scrutiny.
A Dissent to the Cleburne Approach
The Cleburne decision was appealed through a petition for rehearing and
suggestion for rehearing en banc. The petition was denied.82 Judge Garwood
wrote a forceful dissenting opinion. 3 In his dissent, Judge Garwood con-
tended that the case, due to its exceptional importance and novelty, clearly de-
served en banc consideration.4 He argued that a classification based on men-
tal retardation is generically different from that based on gender or il-
legitimacy, the prototypical quasi-suspect classifications:
Women have as much need for, and ability to benefit from, the
same kinds of education as men, and illegitimate children have as
much need for and can equally benefit, from parental support as
legitimate children. Thus, for example, governmental distinctions
between the sexes respecting education, or between legitimate or il-
statutory means than is required under rational basis review).
79. Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 200. The city of Cleburne claimed that the objectives of the or-
dinance were: (1) to avoid undue concentrations of population; (2) to lessen congestion in the
streets; (3) to ensure safety from fire and other dangers; and (4) to protect the health, safety and
welfare of the city's population, in particular (a) to protect the serenity of the existing
neighborhoods, (b) to protect the neighbors from harm, and (c) to protect the mental retardates
themselves by providing an appropriate living environment.
80. Id. The Cleburne City Council considered (a) the attitude of a majority of owners of
property located within 200 feet of the group home; (b) the location of a junior high school
across the street from the home; (c) concern for the fears of elderly residents of the
neighborhood; (d) the size of the home and the number of people to be housed; (e) concern over
the legal responsibility for any actions the mentally retarded residents might take; (f) the home's
location on a 500-year floodplain; and (g) in general the presentation be made before the city
council.
81. Id. at 202.
82. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 735 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1984).
83. Garwood, circuit judge, with whom Brown, Gee, Reavley, Jolly, and Davis, circuit
judges, joined, dissenting.
84. 735 F.2d at 832.
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legitimate children respecting the obligation of parental support,
are quasi-suspect.8'
Judge Garwood noted that the characteristics that define the retarded as a
class, present from birth or early childhood, limit the individual's ability to
perform a wide range of functions and are highly relevant to proper
legislative goals in most respects.
8 6
Judge Garwood believed that the factors relied on by the Cleburne court
for its determination that the retarded are a quasi-suspect class"1 are not suf-
ficient for such purpose, "absent the class' meeting a threshold level of lack
of significant dissimilarity from the rest of society, arising from the class'
defining characteristics, in terms of either its member's needs and abilities to
function, either generally or in respect of the regulatory area under con-
sideration."' 8 Finally, Judge Garwood argued that:
State regulations will inevitably often distinguish between the
retarded and others. To invalidate these distinctions where they
are rationally grounded and do not impair fundamental rights, on
the basis of the test we use to invalidate distinctions based on
gender, constitutes in my view a major and unwarranted extension
of federal judicial power, to the substantial prejudice both of the
judicial function and the principles of federalism. The un-
precedented rule announced by the panel tells us, I fear,
significantly more about the institutional powers of the federal
judiciary than it does about the proper state treatment of the
retarded."
Conclusion
The majority opinion in Cleburne and the dissent to the denial of rehearing
en banc help to illustrate the split in the judiciary on the extension of the use
of heightened scrutiny in equal protection cases. This reflects the continual
debate about the reach of the equal protection clause since the Carolene Pro-
ducts footnote. The original purpose of the scrutiny doctrine flowing out of
the Carolene Products footnote and post-World War II jurisprudence was to
effectuate the application of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments
85. Id. at 832-33: "As observed in Frontiero v. Richardson, 477 U.S. 677, 686 (1973): What
differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability and aligns it
with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to
ability to perform or contribute to society." 735 F.2d at 833 n.3.
86. 735 F.2d at 833.
87. Id. at 834 n.5:
The factors cited by the panel may be summarized as follows (1) likely to reflect
"deep-seated prejudice"; (2) "history of unfair and often grotesque mistreatment,"
including "universally denied admissions into public schools" (until 1970's), segre-
gation "in remote, stigmatizing institutions," and "often have been subject to
ridicule;" (3) "have lacked political power;" (4) "their condition (though
ameliorable) is immutable."
88. Id. at 834.
89. Id.
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to "discrete and insular minorities." Because the original purpose of these
amendments was to protect the rights of blacks, the use of heightened
scrutiny in examining legislative classifications based upon race had a com-
paratively strong textual and historical base. The original categories of race
or alienage were expanded to include gender in a series of decisions
culminating in Craig v. Boren. Conservatives on the Court, among them
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, have strongly criticized the ex-
pansion of the traditional categories triggering heightened scrutiny. Their
main argument is that the extension of the doctrine is not a principled
outgrowth of either the text or the history surrounding the adoption of the
Civil War amendments.
The new method of triggering heightened scrutiny used in Plyler and
Cleburne can be interpreted as the next step in broadening the application of
judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause. In the eyes of conser-
vative jurists and academic commentators, the further expansion of the ap-
plication of heightened scrutiny by the Court in Plyler v. Doe is not
authorized explicitly or implicitly by the text of the Constitution. The oppos-
ing argument by Justice Marshall is that the Court has, under the guise of the
rational basis test, struck down legislation without recognizing that it has in
fact used heightened scrutiny. To Marshall, a more candid approach is to
acknowledge that the Court has used heightened scrutiny at different levels
whether it has recognized this or not. However, the implications of institu-
tionalizing a wider variety of triggering mechanisms for heightened judicial
suspicion raise several questions.
One great danger in a shift to the Plyler method of triggering heightened
scrutiny is that the use of this method could undermine the use of heightened
scrutiny in the traditional areas of race and alienage or the newer area of
gender. If the Court looks at both the classifications and the importance of
the benefit to that class, arguably a lower level of scrutiny could be im-
plicated if an apparently less important benefit is denied to persons on the
basis of race or gender. The Plyler method of aggregating the classification
and the importance of benefit to the group could well become not an alter-
native method of triggering heightened scrutiny but the only method.
Despite the criticisms of the original scrutiny doctrine as mechanical, it has
created a strong foundation for the protection of constitutional rights. An
expansion of the Plyler doctrine could well become a general balancing test
creating an extension of judicial suspicion into areas such as housing for the
mentally retarded, but weakening judicial suspicion in the vital and original
areas of equal protection.
Also, for the purposes of simplicity and precedent, the tests that the
Court uses after heightened scrutiny has been triggered should have at least
some degree of uniformity of application. If each case is decided under a dif-
ferent standard drawn from a "spectrum" of standards, without a clear ar-
ticulation of how to choose levels and the consequences of each choice, there
is no clear precedential value to future decision makers as to what level of
scrutiny is appropriate in later situations.
An alternative method that would allow for extended judicial protection of
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